We model entrepreneurship and the emergence of …rms as an outcome of simultaneous bidding for labor services among heterogeneous agents. What distinguishes our approach from prior work is that occupational choice and job matching are determined simultaneously, so that the opportunity costs of entrepreneurs are accounted for. Those who are relatively unmanageable, while possibly excellent managers themselves, become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs compete and create value by building e¢ cient organizations and o¤ering potentially wellpaid jobs to others. While the entry of an additional entrepreneur typically reduces some individual wages, we show that it always raises the average wage and depresses the average income of incumbent entrepreneurs. This result may help explain the empirically low returns to entrepreneurship.
by every individual -whether to run a …rm or seek employment elsewhere. An income-maximizer will become an entrepreneur if the anticipated pro…t is higher than the going wage. The occupational choice literature (Lucas [29] , Kihlstrom and La¤ont [20] , Evans and Jovanovic [13] , Laussel and Le Breton [25] ) generally treats the entrepreneurial payo¤ as a random variable that depends on personal characteristics, and the wage as an exogenously …xed alternative.
There are three problems with this approach, which this paper is meant to address. (1) Empirically, it is a well-established fact that entrepreneurs tend to earn less, not more, than comparable employees. For example, Hamilton [16] found for the US that staying in a salaried job, or returning to it, pays better than self-employment in the short and in the long run (except for entrepreneurs in the highest income quartile). (2) What jobs are availabe and what they pay depends on which …rms come into existence; hence, the opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur is not independent of who becomes an entrepreneur. (3) If prospective entrepreneurs have valuable skills, why are they not rewarded by potential employers?
To resolve these issues, a theoretical model of entrepreneurship needs to endogenize wages and allow them to be sensitive to individual characteristics. The literature on job matching (Crawford and Knoer [7] , Kelso and Crawford [19] , Roth [35] , Hat…eld and Milgrom [18] ) partially meets these criteria. It constructs personalized wages through a sequential bidding process, where the productive contribution of a worker in a …rm is unique and potentially depends on co-workers. However, what makes these models unattractive for studying entrepreneurship is that the …rms and their technologies are taken as given, and assumptions (e.g. workers are substitutes) are imposed somewhat arbitrarily. One does not learn from these models who becomes an entrepreneur and how this a¤ects the types of technologies that will actually be observed.
In this paper, we model occupational choice and job matching simultaneously: one becomes an entrepreneur if that is preferable to the best job o¤ered by others who are becoming entrepreneurs. It is in any entrepreneur's interest to take advantage of the managerial skills of employees by creating a hierarchical organization structure. This is an important aspect of the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship: more talented individuals have better prospects as entrepreneurs, but also as employees. 1 Hence we make 1 Delegation leads to a departure from the logic in Lazear [26] , [27] , where more ‡exible the process by which entrepreneurs build organizations explicit. 2 In equilibrium, the entrepreneurs are those who can create more value under self-management than under the management of someone else. This may re ‡ect being relatively "unmanageable" more than being a business visionary or manager extraordinaire, although those types of entrepreneurs exist in our model as well. Whatever value entrepreneurs create, they do not have the option to earn a better income working for someone else. As in reality, this logic is consistent with low incomes for many entrepreneurs, who cannot attract good wage o¤ers, given their characteristics.
The organizations that are going to be operated in equilibrium are uniquely determined by the individual characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their workforces. Both complement and substitute relationships between workers are possible. This can cause some of the expected supply-and-demand relationships in the labor market to fail. With …xed labor supply, an increase in the demand for labor would normally increase all wages. With complementarities between workers, this is no longer true: entry of an additional entrepreneur typically reduces some individual wages. However, we show that it still increases wages on average because the losses of some employees will always be compensated by the gains of others. This is not an obvious property unless one imposes a priori that workers are substitutes.
Occupational choices therefore determine how wages compare to entrepreneurial pro…ts. The typical wage may well exceed the typical pro…t if many entrepreneurs are of the "relatively unmanageable" variety, i.e. they are motivated by poor employment options, rather than high expected profits. Their …rms can nevertheless create good jobs for individuals who are valuable employees because they are easily managed. We illustrate this possibility with an example later in the paper and thereby o¤er one explanation for Hamilton's [16] empirical results.
Literature that has allowed for complementarities in a two-sided matching or coalition-formation context has almost exclusively focused on the existence individuals necessarily become entrepreneurs. In a model with organizations , one can bene…t from managerial skills as an employee. 2 There has long been a literature on hierarchical …rms, begun by Rosen [34] , but it does not account for labor market competition between entrepreneurs. Organization forms also arise endogenously in Legros and Newman [28] as a response to moral hazard: their …rms have a choice between investing in monitoring technology (M -…rms) and writing incentivecompatible contracts (I-…rms). We do not treat agency problems explicitly, and we refer to organization in another sense, as an assignment of employees to managers. of stable outcomes (Sasaki and Toda [36] , Dutta and Masso [9] , Banerjee et al. [2] , Ma [30] , Echenique and Oviedo [10] , Klaus and Klijn [21] , Hat…eld and Kojima [17] , Kojima et al. [22] ). The main exception we are aware of is Pycia [32] , who independently from us developed an example of the comparative statics under complementarity (where removing an agent from one side of a two-sided market makes an agent on the other side worse o¤, which cannot occur under substitutability). There are important di¤erences between our model and Pycia's: his …rms are exogenously given, and workers match to …rms before they can bargain over the division of value among members. In our model, individuals join …rms (or start …rms themselves) conditional on wage o¤ers, which is more similar to an actual labor market. Our result that wages rise with entrepreneurial entry on average is also new.
Another related literature considers the formation of clubs (Ellickson et al. [11] , [12] ) and partnerships (Farrell and Scotchmer [14] ). Although clubs are usually interpreted as groups that jointly consume a good, they are formally similar to partnerships, which engage in joint production. These papers contrast with ours in that they refer to coalitions of equal individuals with no internal structure and no notion of entrepreneurship. Zame [39] introduces speci…c tasks into his general-equilibrium framework with …rm formation. A …rm type is de…ned by the roles its workers need to …ll, a production technology, and a contract that allocates net output among the workers. A …rm comes into existence when, in equilibrium, every role attracts an agent with appropriate skills. Hence, the agents coordinate on the equilibrium …rm structure through their job choices, as in our model. But in Zame, there is no explicit mechanism through which coordination occurs -there is no active …rm-building by entrepreneurs. 3 On the other hand, Zame addresses moral hazard and adverse selection issues that we sidestep.
The next section describes the model and assumptions about primitives, as well as the nature of equilibrium. Then we discuss the unique membership and organization of equilibrium …rms. They can be obtained from the primitives by a simple algorithm. Subsequently, we study the equilibrium 3 One can, however, link these models conceptually. If we view our …rms from Zame's perspective, then "entrepreneur"is one of the roles each …rm has to …ll. The contract gives the entrepreneur a claim to all output, which can be valued at the equilibrium goods prices and treated as pro…t. In return, the entrepreneur transfers a sum to the other workers that is divided into wage payments for each role. Our …rm types can be described as sets of skills / actions that an entrepreneur may buy in the labor market, similar to the speci…c skill requirements of roles in Zame's …rms.
payo¤ distribution between entrepreneurs and wage earners. We show that a greater number of entrepreneurs leads to (weakly) higher wages and (weakly) lower incomes for the incumbent entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurial entry is imitative (copies part of an existing organization structure), these e¤ects are strict. The possibility that entrepreneurial incomes fall short of the average wage is illustrated by a simple numerical example. Finally, we elaborate how complement and substitute relationships between workers arise endogenously. Proofs are collected in the appendix.
1 A Labor Market Auction Model of Entrepreneurship
Summary
Our model works as follows. For any pair of agents i and j, in a …nite population N , there are conditional productivities (i) v ij and (ii) v ji that re ‡ect (i) the output that j can create under i's management and (ii) the output that i can create under j's management. The value v ij is realized if j is assigned to i ("is managed by i") in the organization structure their employer (the entrepreneur) implements. The entire matrix of conditional productivities 2 6 4
is assumed to be commonly known. The i-th row lists what each individual in the economy could produce under manager i; the i-th column shows what i could produce under alternative managers. A …rm F N is a set of individuals who are connected through managerial assignments: each member has a superior, who must be a member of F (and who could be oneself). Thus, an assignment function m : N 2 N ! N for a …rm F links each member j of F to another member i of F , producing assignments i = m (j; F ), which are interpreted as "i is the manager of j in …rm F ." Unlike the conditional productivities, the assignment function is not exogenous: it is chosen by the entrepreneur who employs the …rm's members through successful wage o¤ers in the labor market. If h is the entrepreneur who creates the …rm in this sense, we label it F h , and the assignment function that h implements is denoted as m h .
The total output of the …rm is the sum of individual outputs, given the assignments to managers. Hence, …rm F h operates the production function
This value accrues to the entrepreneur, although some of it goes toward paying wages that were promised to employees. Entrepreneurs attract employees through wage bids, which they base on the value employees can create in the …rm. Clearly, the entrepreneur will want to make managerial assignments that maximize the value of the …rm. The resulting organization determines what an employee will add and what the entrepreneur is willing to o¤er.
Our labor market is a simultaneous auction where everyone submits wage o¤ers to everyone, self included. Hiring oneself is what we mean by "becoming an entrepreneur." Hence, everyone in our economy is a potential entrepreneur. Each individual ranks employers, depending on the wage o¤ers she receives. We assume purely monetary preferences, which means that one of the high bids is always accepted (with the caveat that, in evaluating o¤ers to self, one also needs to include the pro…t that could be earned after wage payments as an entrepreneur).
In calculating wage bids, one must take into account who else will join the …rm and be available as a manager. In the perfect information environment 4 Our production function can be viewed as the reduced form of a Cobb-Douglas function with capital and a managed labor force
If entrepreneurs obtain capital at interest rate r in a …nancial market, optimal borrowing implies
so that
(the multiplier is immaterial to our analysis).
that we study in this paper, it is possible to correctly anticipate this, but it involves thinking about three-part strategies. Part (1) is the assignment function: for any subset S that might accept individual i's o¤ers, who should optimally manage whom in S? This determines the value of any …rm i might run, and the incremental value of any employee i might hire. Part (2) is the set of wage o¤ers that individual i will make. Part (3) is the employer choice function: for any set of wage o¤ers individual i might receive, which would i accept? The equilibrium strategy pro…le yields occupational choices, …rm memberships, organization structures and incomes endogenously.
Conditional Productivities and Noncircularity
The conditional productivity v ij 2 R + is the revenue (pro…t before wages) that j can generate for the …rm F h if the entrepreneur (h) assigns i as j's manager. Since the conditional productivity is by assumption exogenous, it is not a¤ected by how many, and which, other individuals i manages, or by who manages i. It also does not depend on the wage j is paid. This need not mean that there is no principal-agent problem. The conditional productivities may re ‡ect, in addition to j's skill at the job and i's skill at designing tasks, how willingly j exerts e¤ort and how well i monitors. If e¤ort were unobservable, v ij could be interpreted as j's expected performance under the optimal contract. We rule out equal conditional productivities under di¤erent managers in the interest of e¢ cient notation: v ik 6 = v kj for i 6 = k. (But employees may be equally productive under a particular manager, so it is possible that v ij = v ik .) The restriction is plausible if the primitive values are drawn from a continuous distribution (that may have a spike at zero). Since v ij 0 by assumption, this means also that for everyone there is some manager who elicits strictly positive productivity.
For the intended interpretation of the model, it is desirable that equilibrium assignments are hierarchical (there is no circular authority, such that i is both superior and subordinate to j). This allows to clearly identify the individual at the top of an organization as the entrepreneur and label …rms accordingly. For organizations to have hierarchical, tree-like structures, conditional productivities need to satisfy an axiom that amounts to transitivity of managerial ability: if i is a superior manager for j (i.e. v ij v jj ), and j is a superior manager for k (i.e. v jk v kk ), then i should be more productive under self-management than under k (v ii v ki ). We extend this logic to arbitrary chains.
Axiom: Noncircularity. Suppose that the members of S N can be assigned "manager ranks" from 1 to n such that v 12 v 22 , v 23 v 33 , . . . , v (n 1)n v nn . Then v n1 v 11 , i.e. n does not rank above i.
One way to think about noncircularity at an intuitive level is to imagine that the population is divided into natural supervisors and natural supervisees, who are completely specialized in these roles. Then, v ij > v jj if i is a supervisor and j is a supervisee, v jj > v ij if roles are reversed, or v ij = v jj if both are of the same type. These conditional productivities satisfy noncircularity. The axiom allows for more complex patterns that retain the ‡avor that a good manager for one individual tends to be a good manager for another. In particular, it could be restated as follows: suppose v jk v kk , then v kj v jj ; moreover, v ki v ii for all i such that v ij v jj ; moreover v kh v hh for all h such that v hi v ii , and so on. But noncircularity does not require one individual to be the best manager for everyone:
A strengthening of noncircularity provides a simpler axiom that …ts many of our intended applications. The following might be termed "positive agency cost:" for all i; j 2 N , v ii v ij , i.e. i can manage self more e¤ectively than others. This statement implies noncircularity, e.g.
Positive agency cost is plausible when management is top-down (i sets tasks for j without seeking j's advice), and delegation may result in a loss from communication barriers and partial e¤ort. The role of j is then merely to carry out instructions as closely as possible.
In applications, it may be meaningful to infer conditional productivities from distances between points associated with the individuals. These points could be attributes in a social or professional characteristics space, where distances represent communication barriers or skill mismatch. Positive agency cost is satis…ed by values that are spatial in the following sense: there exists a mapping f : N ! R l and a distance metric d :
To verify that positive agency cost (and therefore noncircularity) holds, note simply
5 5 The converse, that conditional productivities consistent with positive agency cost are
Since positive agency cost implies noncircularity, the conditional productivities we admit include anything that could be derived from a spatial model, where agents are associated with points in R n and the value one individual can create under another's management declines in the interpersonal distance.
Non-Cooperative Game
The conditional productivities are our economy's data. We de…ne now strategy spaces and our equilibrium notion, which is a re…nement of Nash's. The manager assignment is a function
6 Let M i be the set of such functions. Wage o¤ers are a function w i : N ! R + that speci…es a bid for everyone's labor services (including i's own). Let W i be the set of such functions. 7 Employer choice is a function e i : R n + ! N which names, for every set of o¤ers w 1 (i) ; w 2 (i) ; : : : ; w n (i) to i, the bidder j 2 N whose o¤er is accepted (possibly i's own o¤er). Let E i be the set of such functions. 8 Given a strategy pro…le s 2 i2N S i (where
. By extension, noncircularity is also strictly more general than the spatial property. 6 Notation is loose here. The domain of the function is implicity restricted to pairs (i; C) 2 N 2 N with i 2 C. 7 A subtle restriction is hidden in the form of the wage o¤ers. In general, i would like to o¤er a schedule of wages to each j 2 N that depends on the o¤ers j is making. Then i can reward j for competing less aggressively in the labor market. In particular, i would prevent any employee j from making the best alternative bid for another of i's employees k. To this end, i would o¤er j a higher wage if j bids zero for k. Because we do not allow such tie-ins (by forcing o¤ers to be in R + ), competing bids for i's employees may come from within i's …rm. Internal competition, from potential spin-o¤s, is important in practice. 8 Employer choice, as we have de…ned it, precludes a preference for working under speci…c managers. In practice, the best-paid job is not always chosen: it may be desirable to work with the supervisor that makes the agent most productive; one may prefer to be one's own boss; social and family relations may a¤ect the bene…ts of a job. In our economy, social considerations are absent, job o¤ers are evaluated only on wages. Holding multiple jobs is ruled out. 
(We use letters without subscripts to denote pro…les, e.g. w fw i g i2N is the set of all wage o¤ers.) Since everyone accepts exactly one wage o¤er, the collection of …rms in the economy is a partition of N . Some …rms may well be empty: if F i (s) = ?, we will call i an employee; if F i (s) 6 = ?, i is an entrepreneur.
The pro…t that accrues to an entrepreneur i is the di¤erence between value created (under the organization structure that is implemented by m i ) and wages paid:
Note that the income of entrepreneurs, i.e. i 2 F i (s), is invariant to the wages they pay themselves:
is constant with respect to w i (i).
De…nition: Labor Market. The labor market is a game = N; fv ij g i;j2N ; i2N S i ; fu i g i2N , with strategy space S i = R i W i E i for each i 2 N , conditional productivities that satisfy noncircularity, and preferences represented by a utility function u i : R ! R + that increases monotonically in income w e i (w) (i)+ i (s) for all i 2 N .
We treat as a normal-form game: strategies are chosen simultaneously; in particular, every i 2 N plans the internal structure of any …rm i may run, makes wage o¤ers to all j 2 N , and decides how to select among wage o¤ers i will receive.
A solution of is a Nash equilibrium in undominated pure strategies that leads to well-structured …rms in a sense we will explain. Strategy s i 2 S i is undominated if there exists no s
That is, if s i is not weakly dominated by, and in some situation strictly worse than, another strategy.
The rationale for ruling out equilibria in (weakly) dominated strategies is that agents can otherwise o¤er wages they are not prepared to pay, knowing they will be outbid. In standard auctions with private-values, all bidders believe they have a positive probability of winning, and this prevents overbidding. But in a perfect information setting like ours, there is no risk of winning by accident. To illustrate why we rule out (weakly) dominated strategies, suppose the best manager for j is h, and h and i will both be entrepreneurs. Then i will bid less for j than v hj (since h is not available as a manager in F i ), but possibly more than j's maximal productivity in F i , because in equilibrium h must beat i's bid. Entrepreneurs might have to pay unreasonably high wages -but such equilibria seem unstable, since they depend on a blu¤ that is not called.
In principle, several employees of a …rm could be assigned to manage themselves. This type of arrangement is problematic: no …nal authority exists to resolve coordination failures (admittedly, coordination is not required in the strict con…nes of our model). One might conjecture that i, as the designer of …rm F i (s), would not adopt such a structure, unless it is strictly pro…table to do so. Hence we focus on equilibria where, in each …rm, only one individual reports to self. Moreover, in F i (s), it seems reasonable that this individual should be i. Hierarchical assignments are not an assumption, but a re…nement property of equilibria. We eliminate no strategies and require solutions to be Nash equilibria on the full domain of the strategy space i2N S i .
10 Not joining F i (s) or choosing a non-hierarchical assignment for F i (s), which are 9 If we only impose that there is a unique individual, not necessarily i, who reports to self in F i , we get permutations of …rm names. The membership and structure of F i migrate to F k in alternate equilibria. To elaborate, if someone other than i could be at the top of F i , then the naming of the …rm becomes arbitrary. (We could have j 2 F i at the top of F i or i 2 F h at the top of F h and so forth.) This would lead to duplicate equilibria, where the …rm memberships, managerial assignments and payo¤s are the same, except the …rms are named di¤erently (i is at the top of a …rm that in one equilibrium is called F i and in another equilibrium F j ). Since distinguishing these equilibria is not interesting -they are exactly the same except for naming -we eliminate the duplicates by making precise how …rms are to be named. Since only one individual in a …rm can self-manage, we can do this by imposing that only the person after whom the …rm is named can self-manage. (This is the same as saying the …rm must be named after whoever self-manages.) 10 The reason is partly technical: since strict ordering requires i 2 F i (s) or F i (s) = ?, i could not make o¤ers without committing to be an entrepreneur if the restriction were applied to the strategy space.
unilateral deviations for i, cannot be payo¤-improving in an equilibrium for any i 2 N .
De…nition: Equilibrium. Strategy pro…le s 2 i2N S i is an equilibrium of if, for every i 2 N , s i is undominated, m i is hierarchical, and
As we show next, the identities of the entrepreneurs, as well as the employees and organization structures of their …rms, are determined uniquely in equilibrium. Because entrepreneurs have the power to make ultimatum wage o¤ers in the labor market, their equilbrium incomes are determinate. The same is not true for individual wages, but since all equilibria divide income between entrepreneurs and the total workforce in the same way, the average wage is also unique.
Given hierarchical assignments, so that only entrepreneurs can manage themselves, they must join their own …rms if they hire any employees in equilibrium.
Now we introduce notation that greatly simpli…es the characterization of equilibria. Intuitively, …rms will be blocks of complementary individuals who can create value, i.e. e¤ectively manage each other, independently of outsiders. Equilibrium …rms can be characterized in terms of the set of individuals for whom i induces the highest productivity (is the ideal manager),
and its transitive closure,
The latter is the set of individuals whose ideal manager is someone whose ideal manager is someone ... whose ideal manager is i. The ideal assignment of the entire population could be visualized as a group of trees, each branching out from an individual who is her own ideal manager (a likely entrepreneur) to members of "upper management" whose ideal manager is an entrepreneur, to members of "middle management" whose ideal manager is in upper management, etc. G i contains everyone "under i," the subtree that begins with i.
Lemma (P3). For all
If j belongs to the …rm F i (s ) (where possibly i = j), then j's complementary block G j can create more value in F i (s ) than anywhere else, since …rm has a pro…table deviation -to increase its o¤er -given that i's strategy is to reject in case another …rm makes an equal o¤er). the ideal managers for members of G j are themselves in G j [ j. Hence, j's employer is able to make the highest bid for G j .
Lemma (P4). For all
Then we can describe membership in equilibrium …rms in terms of the complementary blocks.
Nothing in P5 prevents …rms from being empty. In particular,
The structure of the complementary blocks suggests a simple algorithm to solve for equilibrium …rms. We de…ne a function f 0 : N ! N that maps to i 2 N the individual under whose management i is most productive.
Iterations f t+1 (i) = f (f t (i)) successively assign to i the ideal manager, the ideal manager of i's ideal manager, etc. The sequence ff t g t2N converges because N is …nite and conditional productivities are noncircular. Its limit,
, ranges over the set of individuals who are their own ideal managers. These are the entrepreneurs. One can express the …rm run by i as
On the basis of P5, we can say more about the equilibrium organization of …rms. Since j 2 F i (s ) only if the largest complementary block that includes j is in F i (s ), j's ideal manager, k such that j 2 G k , is available. P1 says that k must then be chosen to manage j by all undominated strategies, hence in any equilibrium.
Proposition (P6)
This strengthens P1i (which entails that only assignments to the ideal manager within the …rm are undominated) to the statement that, in equilibrium …rms, employees are assigned to the ideal manager in the entire population. Hence, P6 ensures that equilibria are e¢ cient: everyone is optimally assigned and creates the greatest possible value.
Equilibrium Technology: Complements vs. Substitutes
In standard job matching models, workers are either substitutes or complements by assumption. In the salary adjustment process Kelso and Crawford [19] proposed, the best o¤er to a given worker must be repeated in the following round, while others may raise their bids. The central premise behind this approach is that …rms will not want to withdraw a successful o¤er to one worker when competition for other workers intensi…es. Hence the worker's value to the …rm must not be diminished if co-workers are lost. Earlier, Crawford and Knoer [7] assumed that employee productivity is invariant to who else joins the …rm. Kelso and Crawford [19] generalized to the "gross substitutes" property, which is imposed in a number of subsequent studies. Workers are gross substitutes if higher salary o¤ers to one do not adversely a¤ect …rms'willingness to hire the other. Complementarity has been introduced through preferences over matches to other individuals (colleagues, club members, couples), economies of scale that depend only on the number of workers the …rm employs (Farrell and Scotchmer [14] ) and through supermodularity (Sherstyuk [37] ). 13 A new hire makes existing employees more valuable, and the size of the externality increases with every additional worker. Then no two workers are substitutes.
Imposing such relationships uniformly is appropriate for certain problems, but is not really suited to employees in …rms. Whether a given pair are complements or substitutes is in our approach an aspect of the equilibrium organization technology, not a fundamental property. That substitute and complement workers should coexist in hierarchical organizations is quite intuitive: the di¤erent roles in a …rm are complementary, real substitutability only exists within a role. For example for a building company, di¤erent architects may be substitutes, whereas an architect and a construction worker are complements. Two workers are complements in our model if they interact at di¤erent levels of the hierarchy: one is assigned to manage the other. On the other hand, they are substitutes if they compete on the same level of the hierarchy: one can replace the other as manager of a given group of 13 A related kind of complementarity appears in Kremer's [24] model of interdependent production tasks. Here, the likelihood of completing a job successfully increases in the skill of co-workers at their roles. A skilled individual bestows a symmetric externality on all colleagues. One implication that is not echoed in our model is that similarly skilled individuals tend to be hired into the same …rms.
employees.
Suppose …rm h increases its wage o¤er for employee j of equilibrium …rm F i (s )
Incomes

The Earnings of Entrepreneurs
Like the organization structure, the division of income in a …rm between the entrepreneur and the workforce is uniquely determined. Entrepreneurs have no preference between receiving their income in wages or pro…ts; all that matters are the combined receipts. Let v (1)i ; v (2)i ; : : : denote the highest, second-highest, etc. productivity i has under the potential managers in the population.
Proposition (P7). In any equilibrium s , for all i 2 N such that F i (s ) 6 = ? (i.e. for all entrepreneurs),
It is quite intuitive that an entrepreneur earns the value of his contribution to the …rm, which consists of his own productivity v ii = v (1)i and the productivity increase his management achieves for his subordinates in the ef…cient organization. Because the entrepreneur makes ultimatum wage o¤ers, he can appropriate all bene…ts he bestows on the …rm. Workforce income in …rm F i (s ) is the di¤erence between total value created in F i (s ) and the entrepreneurial income.
Importantly, employees as a group appropriate all value that is created below the highest level of managers, that reports directly to entrepreneurs. Since the value created further down in the hierarchy depends only on employees, other entrepreneurs could replicate it in their …rms by hiring complementary groups and recreating their previous assignments in the new …rm. In particular, anyone can employ the entire workforce of an existing …rm and will only lose some productivity among the "top managers" that depended on the old entrepreneur. This is in one sense a peculiarity of our modeling choices because we restricted a manager's impact to the organization level immediately below. While this is not descriptively realistic, it captures the ‡avor of how value appropriation works in hierarchical organizations. One can imagine how a leader who "inspires" employees at all levels of the …rm could reap large returns, but the essential constraints would remain the same.
We show now that an equilibrium exists, by constructing an explicit equilibrium wage function for the employees. There are, however, many ways to allocate workforce income among employees: entrepreneurs are indi¤erent between wage o¤er schemes that leave the …rm's pro…t una¤ected. It is not necessarily true that the entrepreneur must pay every worker a wage that re ‡ects the productive contribution to the …rm. A wage increase for a group of employees reduces its incentive to defect and may therefore permit o¤-setting wage decreases for other employees (who could otherwise pro…tably attract the group through a unilateral change in wage o¤ers). Hence there is no reason why equilibrium wages should be unique. Such redistributions must, however, leave the total wage bill of the …rm unchanged. Which wage scheme to implement is a matter of choice, not coincidence, given that the entrepreneur makes the o¤ers.
Proposition (P8).
There exists an equilibrium s where the wage o¤ers accepted by i = 1; : : : ; N (including entrepreneurs) are 14
The maximal value created by workers in G i for the …rm F h (s ) depends solely on i; not on i's manager, or even the entrepreneur h. This suggests the solution derived in P8: everyone is paid the incremental pro…t made under his or her managerial supervision (by the group G i for whom i is the best manager) since that pro…t could be transferred to another …rm (if i is hired together with i's complementary block G i ). Hence, managers receive, for each worker they manage, the wedge between the worker's productivity and what that productivity would have been under the best alternative manager. In addition, they get their own productivity under the best alternative manager (which informs the second-highest bid for their services). As natural as this arrangement may appear, it is certainly not the only one that can occur in equilibrium; the entrepreneur can make transfers between workers, since the complementarity structure only makes it optimal to leave the …rm as long as other workers have the same incentive.
Entrepreneurial Entry and the Average Wage
Now, consider adding a new agent to the population, transforming the economy from the prior game to the posterior game^ . We speak of entrepreneurial entry when the new arrival is an entrepreneur in the posterior game and increases the number of entrepreneurs by one (else, it would re ‡ect an acquisition of an existing …rm). Hence, as we de…ne it, entrepreneurial entry does not replace any of the previous entrepreneurs: we are interested in the e¤ect a growing number of entrepreneurs (equivalently, increasing demand in the labor market). 15 Let O fi 2 N s.t. F i (s ) 6 = ?g be the set of entrepreneurs, withN and O denoting, respectively, the population and the set of entrepreneurs after entry.
Proposition (P9). Entrepreneurial entry increases the average employee wage: ifN = N [ fhg and h
At the same time, entrepreneurial entry decreases the average income of incumbent entrepreneurs:
The intuition for rising average wages is the following. The additional entrepreneur increases competition in the labor market by introducing new jobs that represent alternative uses of each individuals'labor services. Some employees are likely to lose in the reassignment of workers, since their managerial capacities are in less demand. Suppose i is an employee who switches to the new entrepreneur. Her former manager was able to appropriate some of i's productivity in the old …rm. After i's departure, the old …rm becomes the best alternative employer for i, and i must therefore appropriate in the new …rm the full value she created in the old …rm. This includes the share her former manager is losing in wages there. Hence, all wage reductions are at least o¤set by raises for the new entrepreneur's hires.
In speci…c circumstances, additional entrepreneurs strictly increase employee wages. We say that imitative entrepreneurial entry by h occurs if h = 2 N and there exists, for some entrepreneur i 2 N , an agent j 2 G i (i's employee and direct subordinate in the prior game's equilibrium s ) who switches to h, i.e. j 2Ĝ h . Such entry is imitative in the sense that h e¤ec-tively hires a "division" of the incumbent …rm F i (s ); F h (ŝ ) replicates the organization of F i (s ) in one top-to-bottom branch.
Proposition (P10). The average employee wage strictly increases (and average income of incumbent entrepreneurs strictly decreases) when imitative entrepreneurial entry occurs.
When one of the new entrepreneur's hires is a "top manager" (head of a division) of an existing …rm, then the manager who loses by the transfer is in fact an entrepreneur. The top manager now appropriates in her new wage the full contribution she made to the old …rm (else the previous employer would su¢ ciently raise the bid to convince her to stay). Because part of it previously did not accrue to employees, average employee income goes up. This explains P10.
The wage increase may be strict even if entrepreneurship is not imitative, since the new entrepreneur could raise the highest alternative productivity for a top manager who nevertheless stays with the old …rm. This makes it necessary for the employer to raise the employee's wage.
Relative Payo¤s: Employees vs. Entrepreneurs
The expected monetary return to entrepreneurship is generally found to be low or negative compared to wage income. Overly optimistic beliefs (Camerer and Lovallo [6] , Koellinger et al. [23] , Arabsheibani et al. [1] , de Meza and Southey [8] , Frank [15] ) or inherent preference for entrepreneurship (Benz and Frey [3] , Blanch ‡ower et al. [4] ) have been advanced as explanations. 16 Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn [38] recently argued that entrepreneurs who are "insured" by an exit option (such as employment) may e¤ectively behave in a risk-seeking manner (accept a negative risk premium), even if they are risk-averse in the usual sense, i.e. with respect to consumption. We o¤er a rationale for lower entrepreneurial incomes that is not a consequence of imperfect information or preferences or insurance. Competition in the labor market forces entrepreneurs to invent roles for employees that maximize their productivities, hence their value to the …rm. Entrepreneurs thereby raise their own "opportunity costs" in the form of well-paid jobs for workers. 17 We can illustrate with a small-scale example how the average income of entrepreneurs can be strictly lower than the average wage employees earn in equilibrium. Recall that equilibrium wages are not unique because income can be redistributed among the employees of a …rm. Such redistributions do not change average wages, since entrepreneurial incomes are uniquely identi…ed. However, for tangibility we use the particular equilibrium wage function from P8:
Example. Consider the following conditional productivities for individuals x, y and z. Value v xy (that y can generate under the management of x) is found where the y-row (listing y's productivity under various managers) meets the x-column (listing x's managerial contribution to various employees).
Employer x y z x 0 7 2 Employee y 0 1 2 z 0 1 2
In equilibrium, all agents are assigned to the manager under whom they are most productive (a feature of e¢ cient organizations) and to the …rm which employs the best manager. Hence, x must be managed by y, while y must be managed by z. There is one …rm in equilibrium: the entrepreneur z hires y and z, and assigns y as x's manager. Agent z emerges as an entrepreneur because he can generate more value under his own management than under the management of anyone else. According to the equilibrium wage function in P8, x will earn 2 (re ‡ecting his best alternative productivity, under z), y will earn 6 (including the di¤erence of 5 between x's productivity under y and under z), and z will pay himself a wage of 2 (including the di¤er-ence of 1 between y's productivity under z and under y) and earn a residual pro…t of 1. Average employee income is 4, compared to the entrepreneurial income of 3. (That entrepreneurial income is lower, as in this case, is a possibility, depending on primitives, not a regularity.)
To verify that these payo¤s constitute a Nash equilibrium, note that, if z o¤ered x less than 2 or y less than 6, y would have an incentive to create a …rm that hires x and generates a total value of 8 (which can be divided between x and y such that both bene…t). The payo¤s make y exactly indi¤erent to the "spin-o¤" option, hence they maximize the entrepreneur z's income. In alternative equilibria, z would transfer income from x to y, perhaps o¤ering x nothing, while y is paid 8. Or x could be o¤ered 7, and y only gets 1.
What is common to all equilibria is that the entrepreneur z cannot extract any rent from the employment of x because x and y could defect if they are not fully compensated for the pro…t they generate between themselves. Since most of the value is created by these two, average employee incomes are high relative to the entrepreneur's. Yet, z can do no better than to run his own business. Now consider the entry of an additional entrepreneur e, leaving all other conditional productivities una¤ected.
Employer
x y z e x 0 7 2 0 Employee y 0 1 2 3 z 0 1 2 0 e 0 1 2 3
The new agent e replaces z as the best manager for y and becomes an entrepreneur since he is most productive working for himself. Therefore, the new …rm structure consists of e's organization, which includes y and x (where y still manages x), and z as a lone self-employed entrepreneur. Because e adopts part of the organization structure formerly implemented by z (copies z's production technology), we call e an imitative entrepreneur. The wage for y given by P8 increases from 6 to 7 because the new bid raises the best alternative o¤er for y (which is now z's), while x's wage remains una¤ected (given that e has no direct use for x). The entry of the imitative entrepreneur bids up the average wage from 4 to 4:5 owing to the greater competition for scarce production resources: e's technology is intensive in the same kind of labor as z's. Among the entrepreneurs, e earns 4 (highest productivity under an alternative manager plus the wedge of 1 from superior management of y and residual pro…t 1), and z loses income he was previously able to appropriate from y: z's wage of 1 is complemented by a pro…t of 1. Incumbent entrepreneurial income therefore declines to 2 (while average entrepreneurial income remains the same).
Finally, suppose e enters with an innovative idea, which causes him to implement a "novel" production technology that is intensive in x's labor.
Compared to the original scenario (without e), e replaces y as the best manager for x, while z remains the best manager for himself and for y. Thus, two …rms emerge in equilbrium: e hires x, and z hires y. Now x bene…ts from e's arrival; his wage increases by 5 from 2 to 7 (since z now makes the second-highest bid, based on z's productivity under the management of z's employee y). Because y no longer manages x, y loses the wedge of 5 he could formerly extract from managing x. The total wage bill in the economy here is unchanged by e's entry; the increase in x's wage matches exactly the decrease in y's wage. This is a re ‡ection of the equilibrium property that the workforce fully appropriates any value created below the top-management level. Since entry only changes the productivity of x, who was previously managed by an employee and therefore shared the value with an employee, x's reassignment merely induces a transfer between employees. The income of entrepreneur z also remains constant because z could not previously extract rents from employing x; z had to compensate y fully for his managerial skills. However, since e attains a higher income than z (namely 4, including the managerial contribution of 1 to y's productivity, and pro…t of 1), entrepreneurial incomes here increase on average after entry.
This example illustrates that the average wage increases when the number of entrepreneurs increases, where innovative entry yields the minimal case that average wage stays the same. The average income of incumbent entrepreneurs decreases (again, it may be constant when entry is innovative), while the average income of all entrepreneurs could increase or decrease, depending on the value the entrant creates for himself. Here, entrepreneurial activity raises its own opportunity cost to a point where entrepreneurial incomes are on average lower than wages (this was the case in all three scenarios).
Conclusion
The choice to become an entrepreneur is usually modelled independently from the matching of non-entrepreneurs to jobs. Since job roles determine wages, and wages represent the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship, occupational choice and job matching are in reality determined simultaneously. Our framework accounts for this. Rather than assume a particular technology where workers are either substitutes or complements, we recognize that entrepreneurs have an incentive to delegate by building hierarchical organizations, where employees perform quasi-entrepreneurial tasks (i.e. become executives) and are rewarded for their talents. Managerial assignments lead to rich internal patterns of complementary and substitute relationships among employees.
We derive a unique value-sharing rule between entrepreneurs and workers in a unique …rm formation equilibrium and show that more entrepreneurs imply a higher average wage income. While this is intuitive when workers are substitutes, job switching in the presence of complementarities imposes losses on co-workers. When the star of a new director rises in Hollywood, the race to sign top actors intensi…es. Another director is forced to cast lesser names and accept a less lucrative contract. Who you work with a¤ects your value to your employer: hence, McKinsey pays the highest salaries in the consulting industry, and consultants in second-tier …rms earn less, even if they are of similar quality. Simple supply-and-demand economics might suggest that greater demand (a world with McKinsey, compared to without) will not reduce anyone's wages while supply is …xed. Yet, if McKinsey disappeared, it is a fair guess that second-tier …rms could hire better consultants who would raise their colleagues'productivities and pay.
When complementarities are present, because …rms have internal organization, the arrival of a new entrepreneur is not good news for all workers. The reasoning that the additional employer can only increase the highest conditional productivity for each worker, and thus individual wages, does not apply when productivities depend on organization designs, which are broken up by entry. Entrepreneurial entry will reduce wages for some workers. What survives, and is robust to the speci…c pattern of complementarities that arises in equilibrium, is that the average wage increases with entrepreneurial entry. Hence, high salaries (and relatively low returns to entrepreneurship) are a hallmark of an entrepreneurial sector that builds e¢ cient organizations and delegates valuable tasks to employees.
The stereotypical founder is a free spirit who would not function well as just another wheel in a clockwork. At the same time, many capable individuals (who are adaptable) pursue corporate careers. Because we account for the value they add as managers, they choose employment over entrepreneur-ship in our model. While it may seem unrealistic that entrepreneurs tend to have relatively little value as employees, our model certainly allows for entrepreneurs to be potential high earners in employment. But the empirical fact that entrepreneurs earn less on average than non-entrepreneurs is more consistent with many entrepreneurs having relatively poor earning prospects in traditional employment. For entrepreneurs who are professionals or skilled inventors, this may not be the case, but there is another type of entrepreneur who never acquired experience in employment or speci…c training and is stuck in self-employment. Our framework accommodates both types, not by assumption but by endogenous determination.
Proofs
P1
(i) Replacing any m i with an optimal assignment of managers, i.e. m i (j; C) = h such that v hj v kj for all k 2 C, can only be bene…cial, and one may construct opposing strategy pro…les s i against which it is a strict improvement over any suboptimal assignment. (Speci…cally, let the person who is suboptimally assigned join F i (s).) If i accepts someone else's wage o¤er, then i's payo¤ increases directly with a higher wage.
(ii) Suppose i's strategy is to turn down a higher wage o¤er from another individual for a lower wage o¤er from another individual for some particular set of o¤ersw i . Clearly, an alternative strategy that always accepts the highest wage o¤er, conditional on i taking a job in another …rm (not becoming an entrepreneur), never fares worse and strictly improves i's payo¤ in casẽ w i is played.
P2
Let F i (s ) 6 = ?, and suppose i = 2 F i (s ). Take any x 0 2 F i (s ), and label m i (x 0 ; F i (s )) = x 1 , m i (x 1 ; F i (s )) = x 2 , etc. Consider the sequence fx t g t2N . Non-circularity (with our assumption that conditional productivities under di¤erent managers are unique) implies v x t+ x t+ > v xtx t+ for all positive integers . Because F i (s ) is …nite, it must be that m i (x t+ ; F i (s )) = x t for some t and some non-negative integer . Since assignments are hierarchical, and i = 2 F i (s ), there exists no
Hence is not zero. P1i requires m i (x t+ ; F i (s )) = x t only if v xtx t+ v yx t+ for all y 2 F i (s ). In particular v xtx t+ v x t+ x t+ , a contradiction.
there exists a sequence fk 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; kg N such that
(uniqueness of the conditional productivities makes the inequalities strict). Applying noncircularity, we have v ii > v ji .
Hence it is not the case that
, which is at odds with j 2 G i G i and uniqueness. Thus (c) j = 2 G j . Let x 2 G j . Then either x 2 G j or there exists a sequence fk
In both cases, j 2 G i implies there is a sequence fl 1 ; l 2 ; : : : ; lg N such that
, and by (ii) and (iiic) j is in G i but not in G j , so the inclusion is strict.
(iv) Suppose there exists x 2 G i \ G j . Then there are sequences K = fk 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; kg N such that
, which establishes the part of the equality. If x 2 G i and x = 2 G i , then there exists fk 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; kg N such that
P4
We show: for all i; j; k 2 N , if j 2 F i (s ) and k 2 G j , then k 2 F i (s ). This implies j 2 F i (s ) only if G j F i (s ), and we apply P3 to argue
Let k 2 G j , and suppose s is such that j 2 F i (s ) while k 2 F h (s ), with h 6 = i. Since s is an equilibrium, the pro…t generated by h's employees cannot be negative:
else h could strictly improve on u h (s ) by o¤ering w h (x) = 0 to all
Suppose i o¤ered every one of h's employees a slightly higher wage:
, suppose i also o¤ered h a wage that exceeds the current payo¤:w i (h) = u h (s )+". Any employer-choice function that would reject these o¤ers is not undominated, hence cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy. (P1ii implies x 2 F h (s ) only if h o¤ered the highest wage to x in s . After topping the o¤er, i must be the high bidder and gain x.) We show that it is in fact an improvement for i to o¤er these wages for some " > 0.
The payo¤ for i when running …rm
if h = 2 F h (s ), and
if h 2 F h (s ). Inequalities (4) and (5) derive, respectively, from (2) and (3).
For all x 2 F h (s ),
since F h (s ) F i s i ; s i . Because s i is undominated, P1i implies that the assignment m i is value-maximizing. Clearly, the maximal conditional productivity for any x 2 F h (s ) must be at least as large in F i s i ; s i as in F h (s ).
Since k 2 G j and j = 2 F h (s ),
On the other hand j 2
The deviation establishes that k 2 F h (s ) for any h 6 = i is not possible in equilibrium. Thus k 2 F i (s ), and we have demonstrated that j 2 F i (s ) leads to G j F i (s ). Let x 2 G j and x = 2 G j . Then there exists fk 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; kg N such that k 1 2 G j ; k 2 2 G k 1 ; : : : ; x 2 G k . From j 2 F i (s ) and k 1 2 G j we have k 1 2 F i (s ), applying our prior argument. Similarly, k 1 2 F i (s ) and k 2 2 G k 1 imply k 2 2 F i (s ). Inductively, k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; k 2 F i (s ), and therefore x 2 F i (s ). It follows that j 2 F i (s ) entails G j F i (s ).
P5
Since
We relabel x as x 0 and reconstruct the sequence fx t g t2N as in the proof of P2. Observe that i 6 = x t for any t; else we would have x 2 G i . By our prior argument, m i (x t+ ; F i (s )) = x t for some t and integer > 0, which violates noncircularity unless m i (x t ; F i (s )) = x t for some x t 2 F i (s ) 6 = i. But this does not satisfy the hierarchy requirement. Hence x 2 N n F i (s ), and we have established F i (s ) = G i .
P6
Follows from P2 and the fact that j 2
P7
To see that
(the …rm's pro…t and wages must be covered by equilibrium output). We shall refer to G j [ j such that j 2 G i n i (i.e. j is a top-level manager) as a branch of i's …rm. Wage payments by i to a branch must exceed the highest productivity G j [j would have in other …rms; else it would be optimal for someone else to beat i's o¤ers to all member of G j [ j. (Namely, for the employer of j's best alternative manager j 0 . If j 0 is employed by i, then it is optimal for the employer of the best alternative manager of j 0 's branch "head" k to beat i's o¤er to
Noncircularity ensures that i is ultimately constrained by competition from other entrepreneurs who have the highest alternative valuation for one branch or several branches jointly. For notational simplicity, we focus on the special case that branches can be considered separately, i.e. the best alternative manager of each branch head in F i (s ) belongs to another …rm. When best alternative managers are employees of F i (s ) in other branches, multiple branches must be considered as one, but the logic is identical.)
The individual who is the best alternative manager for j also has the second-highest valuation for G j (since G j [ j includes the best managers for all members of G j , so that the productivity of G j [ j varies only with j's productivity). Thus, if j 2 G i then i has to pay to
G j and the G j do not intersect by P3, we have
Now
From the entrepreneur's income-maximizing behavior, it follows that the last expression holds with equality.
P8
We construct the equilibrium s as follows. Manager assignments r are value-maximizing (satisfy P6), and employer choices e select the highest wage o¤er (or, in case of a tie, the o¤er from the individual who is the better manager). The high bid for each i 2 N is w (1) (i) = v (2)i + P j2G i v (1)j v (2)j , and is made by the person who is the best manager for i, i.e. h such that v hi = v (1)i . The high bid is matched by the person who is the second-best manager for j, i.e. h 0 such that v h 0 i = v (2)i . The resulting …rms are, for i = 1; : : : ; N , F i (s ) = G i if i 2 G i and F i (s ) = ? otherwise, which means s is hierarchical. We argue that s is also Nash. No one can have an incentive to deviate by reorganizing an e¢ cient equilibrium …rm (change r i ). Accepting the highest wage o¤er is always best for non-entrepreneurs and, given the form of the winning o¤ers, implies that i becomes an entrepreneur if and only if i 2 G i . In F i (s ), i adds at least v ii + P j2G i v (1)j v (2)j under the manager assignment m i . If i 2 G i , then v ii = v (1)i , so i can earn more income through contributing to pro…t in F i (s ) than from the highest competing wage o¤er. Conversely, suppose i = 2 G i , but i turns down the highest wage o¤er to become an entrepreneur. Because the entrepreneur's income is independent of the wage paid to self, this scenario is akin to an increase in wage o¤ers. We may therefore con…ne ourselves to considering changes in wage o¤ers.
Observe …rst that i cannot pro…tably reduce wage o¤ers. Suppose i is an entrepreneur. Employing j 2 F i (s ) at wage w (1) (j) is strictly pro…table for i, since j 2 G i and j 2 G k implies k 2 G i , so that j is assigned to the best manager and directly adds v (1)j > v (2)j to the …rm F i (s ). Moreover G j G i , hence j indirectly adds at least P x2G i v (1)x v (2)x to F i (s ) as the best manager for the group G j . O¤ering less than w (1) (j) loses j to the previously second-highest bidder and therefore reduces i's pro…t. If i is not an entrepreneur, then none of i's wage o¤ers are accepted, and lowering them does not change anything for i.
No more can i pro…tably increase wage o¤ers. If i is to bene…t from raising o¤ers, they must be accepted and add to membership in F i (s ). Suppose i attracts the group C from outside F i (s ). Then i must o¤er strictly more than w (1) (j) to each j 2 C: X Pre-entry total employee income is: X i2N nO
Post-entry, the set of employees is unchanged and highest-and secondhighest conditional productivities for any agent either stay the same or are raised by the new entrepreneur. Hence total employment income could only fall for one reason: that the set N n [ j2E G j shrinks and the set [ j2E G j n j grows, i.e. some who were previously managed by employees are now directly managed by entrepreneurs. But any such individuals must be managed by the new entrepreneur, given that no other entrepreneur's value changed. Therefore, they belong, post-entry, toĜ h , so thatv (1)j =v hj . andv (2) Incumbent entrepreneurs i for whom v (1)i increases post-entry must become employees of the new entrepreneur, but the de…nition of entrepreneurial entry rules this scenario out (such entry does not replace existing entrepreneurs). Therefore, the …rst term remains constant. The set [ j2E G j n j of employees for whom an incumbent entrepreneur is the best manager can only shrink after the new entrepreneur appears. The highest conditional productivities for those who remain in this set post-entry cannot have increased (else they would now be managed best by the new entrepreneur). The second-highest conditional productivities cannot have decreased. Hence the second term diminishes, so that total income of the incumbent entrepreneurs decreases. Since kOk = Ô and
average income of incumbent entrepreneurs weakly falls.
P10
Suppose entrepreneurial entry is imitative. Then, by de…nition, there exists for some incumbent entrepreneur i an employee j 2 G i who switches to the new entrepreneur, i.e. j 2Ĝ h . Thenv (1)j =v hj > v ij = v (1)j and v (2)j =v ij > v (2)j . Recalling that X i2N nO
and also that the identities of employees are unchanged and nothing can decrease on the right-hand side, the strict increase in v (1)j and v (2)j implies a strict increase in the average employee income. Because i loses a member of G i n i and X (while incumbent entrepreneurs cannot become best managers for anyone new as a result of entrepreneurial entry), the average average income of incumbent entrepreneurs strictly decreases.
